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COMMENT ON RECENT DECISIONS
Ins. Co., 312 Ill. 525, held that the contraction of typhoid fever may be regarded
as accidental if the disease is contracted by accidental means. In Frankamp v.
Fordney Hotel, 222 Mich. 525, an accident is defined to mean an unforeseen
event occurring without the will or design of the person whose mere act causes
it. That case specifically held that the contraction of typhoid fever from drink-
ing water was an accidental injury. Other cases in accord are Ames v. Lake
Independence Lumber Co., 226 Mich. 83; Wiltfong v. Lake Independent Lumber
Co., 226 Mich, 91; Brodin's Case, 124 Me. 162; Vennen v. New Dells Co., 161
Wis. 370; Wasmuth-Endicott v. Karst, 77 Ind. App. 279. Two cases, contra,
State ex rel Fairbault Woolen Mills et al. v. District Court of Rice County,
138 Minn. 210, and Industrial Commission v. Cross, 104 Ohio St. 561, can be
distinguished because of differences in the Workmen's Compensation Acts under
which they were decided. It would seem to follow that the case of John Riss-
man & Son v. Industrial Commission, the instant case, is decided on well es-
tablished principles and is in accord with modern decisions. F. A. E. '28.
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONs-LIABILITY FOR ToRTs-PRoxIMATE CAusF-Plain-
tiff was riding a bicycle. The wheel of a passing truck dropped into a hole in
the cartway causing mud to splash in the plaintiff's eyes. Small stones in the
mud penetrated the plaintiff's eye and caused loss of sight of the eye. Held, in
an action against the city, that the defect in the street caused the passing ve-
hicle to splash the mud in the plaintiff's eye, that such defect was the proximate
cause of the injury, and that the city was liable. Stemmler v. City of Pittsburgh,
(1926) 287 Pa. 365, 135 Atl. 100.
This case is interesting because of the indirect nature of city's liability.
Municipal corporations are bound to keep streets in reasonably safe condition.
Failing to do so makes them liable for all injuries due to such negligence. Bas-
sett v. St. Joseph, 53 Mo. 290. In Twist v. City of Rochester, 55 N. Y. S. 850,
the court held that a city must use reasonable care in keeping its streets safe
for public use, and if any injury results to a traveller it cannot claim exemption
from liability because its streets are public. Authorities are practically uniform
in holding a city liable for injuries resulting from its negligence in failing to
keep streets in repair even though the defective street was not the sole cause
of the injury. Belleville v. Hoffman, 74 Ill. App. 503. Thus a city was liable
where the injury was produced as a result partly of a defect in the street, and
partly of nature of the accident. Lacon v. Page, 48 Ill. 499; Vogel v. City of
West Plains, 73 Mo. App. 588; Barrett v. Savannah, 9 Ga. App. 642, 72 S. E. 49;
Vogelsan v. City of St. Louis, 139 Mo. 127, 40 S. W. 653. In Joliet v. Shufelt,
144 Ili. 403, 32 N. E. 969, the city was held liable where a street was negli-
gently constructed and plaintiff was thrown from his buggy and injured even
though the accident would not have occurred if the horses's harness had not
broken. If, however, the injuries are a result of a collision with a fire-truck
the city is not liable although a defect in the street contributed to the collision.
City of Louisville v. Bridwell, 150 Ky. 589, 150 S. W. 672; Or if the plaintiff's
negligence was the proximate cause of the injury there can be no recovery
against the city even though the street was defective. De Camp v. Sioux City,
74 Ia. 392, 37 N. W. 971. E. C. F. '27.
NEGLIGENCE-MOTOR VEHICLES-DUTY OwED By DRIVER TO SELF-INITED
GuEsT.-The plaintiff in this case was a widow who was employed in Pine Bluff.
The defendant was going to Little Rock by automobile and the plaintiff, who
was anxious to see her children living there, obtained the defendant's permis-
sion to accompany him. The testimony introduced by the plaintiff tended to
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show that the automobile in which they made the trip was turned over on ac-
count of fast driving by the defendant, which resulted in injury to the plaintiff.
The trial court instructed a verdict for the defendant on the theory that the
only duty he owed the plaintiff while riding in his automobile as a self-invited
guest was to refrain from injuring her willfully or wantonly. The testimony
failed to reveal any evidence of a willful or wanton attempt on the part of the
defendant to injure the plaintiff. Held, error to instruct a verdict on this the-
ory. Justice Humphreys was of the opinion that the driver of an automobile
was required to exercise ordinary care in the operation thereof, to transport
his passengers safely, whether guests by sufferance, self-invited guests, or in-
vited guests. Two of the other Justices thought that in a gratuitous carriage
for the sole benefit of the guest only slight diligence is required of the driver,
and he becomes liable only for gross neglect. Black v. Goldweber, 291 S. W.
(Ark.) 76.
The case is peculiar in that it presents the three theories of the liability of an
automobile driver for injuries sustained by a guest in the course of the ride.
The theory of the trial court is followed in only two or three jurisdictions.
These decisions preserve the distinction between invitee and bare licensee and
they apply the general rule of duty to bare licensees to owners and drivers of
automobiles and other vehicles. The injured party having solicited the ride,
the act of the driver in acceding to the request possessed none of the elements
of a contract and the driver is liable only if the injury to the self-invited guest
is inflicted willfully or wantonly. See Lutvin v. Dopkus, 94 N. J. L. 64; Crider
v. Yolande Coal & Coke Co., 206 Ala. 71 89 So. 285; Reed v. Rideout's Am-
bulance, 212 Ala. 428.
Another respectable minority of courts, clinging to the distinction between the
degrees of care, hold that a gratuitous carrier owes only slight diligence to an
invitee, and the driver of an automobile therefore is not liable for the injury of
a guest unless such injury is the result of gross negligence on the part of the
driver. See Marcinowski v. Sanders, (Mass.) 147 N. E. 275; Massaletti v. Fit.-
roy, 228 Mass. 487, 118 N. E. 168; Epps v. Parish, 26 Ga. App. 399, 106, S. E.
297.
By far the majority of the courts follow the rule as cited by Justice
Humphreys, that the driver of an automobile is required to exercise ordinary or
reasonable care in the operation thereof, to transport his passengers safely,
whether guests by sufferance, self-invited guests, or invited guests. These de-
cisions abolish the distinction between bare licensee and invitee and apply the
rple to guests at sufferance as well as to guests by invitation. The driver, hav-
ing accepted the passenger, owes him the duty of exercising reasonable care,
and not unreasonably to expose him to danger and injury by increasing the
hazard of travel. Recent decisions in the various states recognizing this rule
are Sheehan v. Foster, 251 Pac. (Cal.) 235; Dickerson v. Connecticut Co., 98
Conn. 87; Munson v. Rupker, 148 N. E. (Ind. App.) 169; Mayberry v. Sivcy, 18
Kan. 291; Beard v. Klusmeier, 158 Ky. 153; Jacobs v. Jacobs, 141 La. 272;
Fitziarrell v. Boyd, 123 Md. 497; Hemington v. Hemington, 221 Mich. 206, 190
N. W. 683; Rappaport v. Stockdale, 160 Minn. 78, 199 N. W. 513; Great South-
ern Lumber Co. v. Hamilton, 137 Miss. 55, 101 So. 787; Alley v. Wall, 272 S. W.
(Mo. App.) 999; Liston v. Reynolds, 69 Mont. 480, 223 Pac. 507; Batter v. Griess,
105 Neb. 381, 181 N. W. 156; Clark v. Traver, 200 N. Y. S. 52; Mitchell v. South-
ern Ry., 176 N. C. 645, 97, S. E. 628; Grabau v. Pudwill, 45 N. D. 423, 178 N. W.
124; Farrell v. Solski, 123 At. (Pa.) 423; Leonard v. Bartle, 135 At. (R. I.)
853; Tennessee Central Ry. Co. v. Vanhoy, 143 Tenn. 312, 226 S. W. 225; Moore-
field v. Lewis, 96 W. Va. 112, 123 S. E. 564; Glick v. Baer, 86 Wis. 268, 201
N. W. 752; Ryan v. Snyder, 29 Wyo. 196, 211 Pac. 482. F. A. E. '28.
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